Driving the global debate on IP and antitrust from an empirical perspective.


August 3, 2016
Patent Licensing and Bargaining with Innovative Complements and Substitutes
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper

Inventors and producers bargain over royalties to license multiple patented inventions. In the first stage of the bargaining game, inventors offer licenses to producers and producers demand licenses. In the second stage of the game, inventors and producers engage in bilateral bargaining over...

September 1, 2016
Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents
Criterion Economics

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is a standards-setting organization (SSO). In 2015, it ratified amendments to its patent policy to mandate that a reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) royalty for a standard-essential patent (SEP)—more precisely, an Essential Patent...

September 25, 2016
A New Dataset on Mobile Phone Patent License Royalties
Hoover IP² Working Paper

This note describes a new dataset to estimate the Average Cumulative Patent Royalty Yield paid in the mobile phone value chain— the sum total of patent royalty payments earned by licensors, divided by the total value of mobile phonesshipped. We estimate the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield for...

LeadershIP 2017

The LeadershIP conferences are a catalyst for a balanced and open discussion on current global issues at the intersection of intellectual property rights (IP) and antitrust policy.

LeadershIP Events
March 27, 2017 | Washington, DC