Social Science Research Network (SSRN)

August 8, 2017
Contreras, Jorge

Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: Revisiting 'Joint Negotiation'

In an environment in which widely-adopted technical standards may each be covered by large numbers of patents, there have been increasing calls for courts to determine “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) royalties payable to holders of standards-essential patents (SEPs) using “top-...Read More

April 2017
Wong-Ervin, Koren and Hicks, Evan and Slonim, Ariel

Tying and Bundling Involving Standard-Essential Patents


Competition agencies around the world, including in Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States (at least prior to the current administration), have taken the unwarranted position that antitrust enforcement involving standard-essential patents (SEPs) upon which a patent...Read More

November 2016
Llobet, Gerard and Padilla, Jorge

The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents

The concept of “royalty stacking” is based on the so-called Cournot complements problem. Specifically, it is argued that the decision of a large number of inventors to license complementary patents necessary for the development of a product leads to excessively large royalties. In their paper,...Read More

Mann, William

Creditor Rights and Innovation: Evidence from Patent Collateral

Patents have attracted controversy over whether they foster or hinder innovation. In his paper, William Mann is one of the few that establish a causal relationship between patents and R&D activity. The study begins by presenting empirical evidence for the pledge of patents as collateral to...Read More

Larouche, Pierre and Schuett, Florian

Repeated Interaction in Standard Setting

Pierre Larouche and Florian Schuett construct an economic model of standard setting that shows repeated interaction among SSO participants, combined with technological complementarities alleviate the “patent hold-up” issue. The authors illustrate that contributors are able to discipline others...Read More

Putnam, Jonathan and Williams, Tim

The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit (SSPPU): Theory and Evidence

Jonathan Putnam and Tim Williams’ paper is the first to offer theoretical and empirical evidence for showing that the adoption of the SSPPU rule as a royalty base conflicts with fundamental economic principles and industry practices. Using economic theory, the authors establish that “the SSPPU...Read More

Petit, Nicolas

EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes


This paper describes the degree of obligation created by a FRAND commitment on the holders of a Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) from an EU competition law perspective. It shows that the EU courts case-law does not seem supportive of the reading of FRAND as a distributional, pricing...Read More

Padilla, Jorge and Wong-Ervin, Koren

Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level

This article shows through a simple model, that due to the FRAND commitment and because most FRAND-assured SEP holders do not assert their patents at the component level, there is likely no foreclosure or exclusionary conduct or otherwise harm to competition.Read More