(F)RAND

August 8, 2017
Contreras, Jorge

Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: Revisiting 'Joint Negotiation'

In an environment in which widely-adopted technical standards may each be covered by large numbers of patents, there have been increasing calls for courts to determine “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) royalties payable to holders of standards-essential patents (SEPs) using “top-...Read More

February 7, 2017
Epstein, Richard and Noroozi, Kayvan

Why Incentives for 'Patent Holdout' Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why it Matters

This paper demonstrates that an implementer-centric view of FRAND is false and incentivizes the very patent holdout problem FRAND was intended to avoid. An increasing number of judges, legislators and scholars wrongly believe that the FRAND commitment was principally created to advance the...Read More

12/13/2016
Petit, Nicolas

EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes

Abstract

This paper describes the degree of obligation created by a FRAND commitment on the holders of a Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) from an EU competition law perspective. It shows that the EU courts case-law does not seem supportive of the reading of FRAND as a distributional, pricing...Read More

11/18/2016
Layne-Farrar, Anne and Wong-Ervin, Koren

Standard-Essential Patents and Market Power

While most agencies that have addressed the issue recognize that intellectual property rights (IPRs), including standard-essential patents (SEPs), do not necessarily confer market power, there remains much confusion over how to determine the proper relevant market and the issue of whether a...Read More

November 2016
Sherry, Ed and Teece, David

A Public Policy Evaluation of RAND Decisions in the U.S. Courts

Standards-setting organizations (SSOs) typically ask holders of patents that are believed to be “essential” to the manufacture of standards-compliant products (sometimes termed standard-essential patents or “SEPs”) to commit to making licenses available to an “unlimited” number of potential...Read More

September 2016
Baron, Justus and Pentheroudakis, Chryssoula and Thumm, Nikolaus

FRAND Licensing In Theory And In Practice: Proposal For A Common Framework

September 2016
Sher, Scott and Tennis, Bradley

Exploiting Others’ Investments in Open Standards

September 2016
Kattan, Joseph and Ordover, Janusz and Shampine, Allan

FRAND and the Smallest Saleable Unit

6/1/2016
Geradin, Damien

FRAND Arbitration: The Determination of Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Rates for SEPs by Arbitral Tribunals

At the core of most disputes concerning the licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) lies the inability of the SEP holder and the standard implementer to agree on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) license terms. As an alternative to court litigation, a growing number of...Read More

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